

S E C R E T

## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #1096-83  
8 February 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Exclusive for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : David Y. McManis  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT : National Intelligence Officer for Warning and National  
Warning Staff Staffing


*John*

1. Attached is a rundown on NIO/W and NWS staffing. In summary, it states that the DCI and DDCI approved the establishment of "a small National Warning Staff," and a "tentative T/O" of four analysts.

2. Without being privy to the Director's decision I garnered DIA and Service support to maintain a slightly higher T/O, i.e., five analysts with an additional two CIA billets as yet unfilled.

3. Request that you allow me to proceed with that manning level with the clear understanding that the mission is primarily process-oriented and not substantive. I detailed in the attachment a number of the initiatives currently under way which I hope will convince you of our direction.

4. I will get on your calendar for a further discussion.



David Y. McManis

25X1

Attachment:  
As stated (h/w)

S E C R E T

SECRET

## I. BACKGROUND

The National Intelligence Officer for Warning and the National Warning Staff have been created in response to a commonly perceived requirement to insure that community elements are fulfilling their responsibilities in the broad areas of warning, and the need for a catalyst in those areas where joint community action is required. The intent is specifically not to create another analytic warning staff to run in competition with other community activities or even to assume responsibilities of community participants when for one reason or another those responsibilities remain unfulfilled.

Upon his arrival in the position, the official NIO for Warning was staffed (excluding the NIO) by one senior civilian analyst, two senior contract analysts, three senior military analysts, and 3-4 support personnel divided between Headquarters and the Pentagon. The NIC had further identified two analytic billets, which to date, have not been filled. Only most recently the NIO for Warning learned that the DCI, with concurrence from the DDCI, has agreed to a "tentative T/O" of four analytic personnel, and the establishment of "a small National Warning Staff."

During the process of developing a work plan, the NIO for Warning garnered significant support from the Director, DIA, and the service intelligence chiefs which was manifested through their agreement to continue to provide billets and bodies to the NWS.

## II. DISCUSSION

As noted above there is firm intent not to develop another "early warning staff" although the current DCI is strongly supportive of the NIO and NWS playing at least some role as "warners". Nevertheless, the function of the NWS will remain primarily as an expeditor of community initiatives in the warning area; as a gadfly and ombudsman; an identifier of alternative hypotheses; and as an evangelist selling the warning gospel and enhancing the sensitivity to a broad number of warning problems. Despite a great deal of community support, there remains, under the surface, a strong measure of paranoia between military and political activities (there are other axes of paranoia, such as SIGINT versus Imagery). The current NWS, i.e., one incorporating analysts from the services as well as DIA, is effectively keeping that paranoia in check, and more importantly is resulting in significant real support for the NIO for Warning, and the warning mechanism.

The NIO for Warning has throughout kept the Warning Working Group involved and has recently added the Service Intelligence Chiefs as members. (The WWG is being used as a steering group and the members as primary POC's for the organizations they represent.)

## III. CURRENT ACTIVITIES

The 1983 Agenda for the NIO for Warning is attached but simply it comprises initiatives in Operation Centers interface, training, doctrine, reporting, interfaces with allies, and information handling technology in the outyears. A representative list of specific activities now underway or planned for the immediate future follows:

SECRET

S E C R E T

- Review of CRITIC handling procedures with the goal of reissuing the Critic Handbook and producing a simplified DCID.
- Investigation of NOIWON Conference problems and work toward improving both the quality of the medium and the operational procedures.
- Close involvement with the White House on their efforts to develop a new enhanced Crisis Management Facility;
- Establishment of an ad hoc National Warning Training Working Group to review community curricula for their adequacy and the development, as necessary, of training modules;
- Informal seminars on warning reporting to illuminate community problems with existing forms and to eventually make recommendations for improved warning reports;
- Working with the NIC to sharpen the monthly warning meetings conducted by the NIO's and also the focus of the monthly warning assessment;
- Development of a proposal for a "DCI Alert";
- Development of a series of team building exercises for Operation Center Chiefs and Senior Operations Officers, ranging from stress training through visits to SAC, NORAD, CINCLANT, etc.
- Playing a major role, although not primary, in the Estimates on Warning of Warning of War in Korea and Warning of War in Europe;
- Serving as a NIC focal point for assistance and review of vendor systems involved in warning;
- Speaking on the subject of warning to Intelligence Schools and senior service schools;
- Acting as a gadfly throughout the community on substantive intelligence matters where the NIO for Warning feels uncomfortable. These have included:

25X1

S E C R E T

25X1

#### IV. STAFFING REQUIREMENT

The initial staffing would be that currently in place, augmented by a promised secretary for the DIA office, and a mid- and low-level CIA analyst for which NIC billets have been identified. This would result in the following complement:

##### Headquarters

NIO

A/NIO (Military)

CIA (DDO?) analyst

CIA junior analyst

Secretary

##### Pentagon

Senior Analyst (DIA)

Two military analysts

CIA Contract Analyst  
(subject to July review)

NCO (DIA)

Secretary (DIA)

While I believe that a strong case could be made for the addition of analysts at the Pentagon from NSA and CIA, the recommendation will be withheld until the office is functioning fully and in a manner consistent with the desires of the DCI, DDCI and the NIO/W.

S E C R E T

NIO WARNING - 1983 AGENDA

PROBLEM

(Communications)

Operations and Command Center  
Interfaces

Warning Vehicles

INITIATIVES

Review with DoD (DCA, C3I, NSA, CIA/OC, and ICS ongoing studies and make recommendations as concerning the appropriate role of the DCI. (Unclear what positive role the NIO/W can perform in this area although it is one of the major warning problem areas.)

Provide community leadership to confederation of operations and command centers to:

- validate and rework existing SOPs and directives;

- develop statement of requirements for information handling improvements to include NOIWON upgrade;

- sponsor seminars and other team building exercises for members of this community.

Review NIC Monthly Warning Assessment activities and propose to DCI a structured system of reporting to extend beyond the current distribution.

Review above in context of other warning reports including Alert Memoranda, NID, Watch Committee report and propose modifications as necessary and desired.

Sponsor community seminars and "brainstorming" sessions on the problem of warning reporting.

Monitor and guide as appropriate other community warning mechanisms such as WIMS, S&T enigmas; concurrently sponsor the development of warning indicators in other areas such as economic and political warning.

Critically review selected NIEs for their handling of warning subjects and identification of potential indicators. Participate in the production of warning estimates as necessary.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

25X1

## Training

Supervise the use of the CRITIC system; establish requirement for routine testing of system.

In cooperation with Intelligence Agency schools develop and integrate warning curricula and training modules; subsequently expand efforts to military service schools and U&S commands.

Sponsor community-wide seminars and forums on Warning; provide missionary services to the extent possible.

## Doctrine

Develop and maintain a compendium of information on policies, doctrines, methodologies and procedures relevant to warning.

Document existing I&W initiatives in the third-party arena with the intent of providing a comprehensive overview of these activities. <sup>25X1</sup>

Sponsor and guide research by government and academic activities.

Work with Senior Service schools to develop opportunities for research in warning by students.

Establish a capability to review past and ongoing crisis situations with the goal of improving mechanisms and procedures.

## Alternative Analysis

Selectively identify problems requiring alternative analysis and establish working groups to develop scenarios, indicators and as appropriate collection guidelines. Serve as a medium for the exploration of new techniques and approaches.

## Second-party Relationships

25X1

## Information Handling Technology

Maintain minimal awareness and involvement in information handling technology as it may pertain to analytic endeavors over the next five to ten years.

S E C R E T

NIC #1096-83  
8 February 1983

SUBJECT: NIO/W and NWS Staffing

Distribution:

- 1 - Exclusive for the DDCI
- 1 - NIO/W
- 1 - A/NIO/W
- 1 - NWS
- 1 - NIO/W Chron

S E C R E T